Self-Determination, Sovereignty, and the Failure of States: Somaliland and the Case for Justified Secession by Kreuter, Aaron
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Journal of International Law
2010
Self-Determination, Sovereignty, and the Failure of
States: Somaliland and the Case for Justified
Secession
Aaron Kreuter
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjil
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota
Journal of International Law collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kreuter, Aaron, "Self-Determination, Sovereignty, and the Failure of States: Somaliland and the Case for Justified Secession" (2010).
Minnesota Journal of International Law. 341.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjil/341
  
363 
Note 
Self-Determination, Sovereignty, and the 
Failure of States: Somaliland and the Case 
for Justified Secession 
Aaron Kreuter* 
INTRODUCTION 
Two distinct regions divide modern-day Somalia. On one 
hand, this division is geographical. On the other, it cuts much 
deeper, between peace and violence, and stability and 
instability. Clan tensions, widespread civil war, and maritime 
piracy mar the southern half of the country.1 The government is 
powerless to combat the instability, resulting in an exodus of 
Somali refugees into the nearby countries of Kenya and Yemen.2 
The lives of the residents in the south consist of a struggle for 
survival amidst violence and anarchy.3 
The situation in the north, the region of Somaliland, is 
conspicuously different.4 Until the middle part of last decade, 
the inhabitants of the region participated actively in the civil 
 
* J.D. Candidate 2011, University of Minnesota Law School; B.S. 2008, University of 
Minnesota. The author would like to thank Ray Konz for his thoughtful comments 
and advice, and all the other members the Journal for their contributions to this 
Note. 
 1. Robert Draper, Shattered Somalia, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, Sept. 2009, at 76–
77; see also Austin Bay, The Pirates of Puntland, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2008, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/nov/28/the-pirates-of-puntland 
(discussing the use of Somalia as a base by the pirates of Somalia). 
 2. Draper, supra note 1, at 77. 
 3. Id. at 79 (“Asked to recall memories of when life was good, Mohammed 
stares out toward sea. His smile is not of the youthful kind. ‘I don’t remember any,’ 
he says.”). 
 4. See id. at 86. There is another region in north Somalia known as Puntland, 
to the east and distinct from Somaliland. Though the populations are similar, 
Puntland is geographically smaller and significantly more politically unstable than 
Somaliland. See Bay, supra note 1. 
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war that continues to rage in the south.5 In 1996, however, the 
leaders of the northern clans agreed to cooperate in a peace 
conference where they gathered “to reconcile clan conflicts at 
what one participant call[ed] ‘the Guinness record kind of 
conference—months of talking and finally agreeing on a charter 
to set up a government. And while we were having this 
conference, out in the countryside, everyone came and put their 
guns under a tree.’”6 Since the people of Somaliland unilaterally 
decided to pursue peace, the region has enjoyed a period of 
relative stability.7 It has not enjoyed corresponding economic 
prosperity, however, partly because Somaliland is unable to 
form meaningful relationships with other nations, who refuse to 
recognize the government of Somaliland as independent from 
Somalia.8 For this reason, the people of Somaliland wish to 
secede from Somalia, but no government currently recognizes 
their right to independence.9 
This Note seeks to analyze Somaliland’s assertion of 
independence in light of international norms and theories of 
self-determination and secession, and to propose a solution to 
the deficiency in the law as it currently stands. Part I outlines 
the principles of statehood, the various legal standards of self-
determination, the legal justifications for secession, and the 
right to territorial integrity. Part I also discusses political 
problems with recognizing seceding states, and the recent 
history and status of Somaliland and Somalia. Part II discusses 
the applicability and implications of each of the various legal 
standards and theories as they relate to Somaliland’s case for 
secession. This Part concludes that under the current 
international standards, Somaliland lacks a sufficient legal 
basis to separate and become an independent, sovereign nation. 
Part III lays out an answer to this problem whereby, in limited 
circumstances, citizens within a failed state may justifiably 
secede. 
 
 
 5. Draper, supra note 1, at 86. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Scott Baldauf, In Somalia’s Break-Away Corner, an Oasis of Stability, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 11, 2009, at 6. 
 8. See Draper, supra note 1, at 86. 
 9. The Nation Nobody Knows, ECONOMIST, Apr. 14, 2001, at 42 (“Somaliland 
is not recognised as independent by anybody . . . .”). 
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I. THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATE INDEPENDENCE: 
ISSUES OF STATEHOOD, SELF-DETERMINATION,  
AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY 
A. TWO COMPETING THEORIES OF STATEHOOD 
The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of 
States of 1933 is often cited as a primary international legal 
instrument defining the concept of statehood.10 It contains the 
following prescription: a state “shall constitute a sole person in 
the eyes of international law.”11 For this reason, “States are 
juridically equal, enjoy the same rights, and have equal capacity 
in their exercise.”12 To be a state, a territory must have “a) a 
permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; 
and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.”13 
Furthermore, “The political existence of the state is independent 
of recognition by the other states.”14 
The Montevideo Convention is the clearest statement of the 
declaratory theory of statehood.15 The declarative theory 
requires two things: that the prospective state meets each of the 
four elements listed above and that the state declares its 
sovereignty.16 Thus, statehood does not depend on recognition or 
acknowledgement by other nations.17 The United Nations has 
contributed to the development of this theory since the time of 
the Montevideo Convention by acknowledging the importance of 
democracy, equal rights, and respect for self-determination.18 
Some argue, however, that in practice, states place at least some 
 
 10. See generally, Eric Ting-Lun Huang, The Modern Concept of Sovereignty, 
Statehood and Recognition: A Case Study of Taiwan, 16 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 99, 111–
12 (2003) (citing the Montevideo Convention as a key document in determining a 
modern state’s statehood and sovereignty). 
 11. Convention on the Rights and Duties of States art. 2, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 
Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 [hereinafter Montevideo Convention]. 
 12. Id. art. 4. 
 13. Id. art. 1. 
 14. Id. art. 3. 
 15. Brad Poore, Note, Somaliland: Shackled to a Failed State, 45 STAN. J. INT’L 
L. 117, 136 (2009). 
 16. Huang, supra note 10, at 116 (“[A] political entity that acquires the criteria 
for statehood does not become a state unless it declares that it is an independent 
sovereign state. This is derived from international custom that a declaration of the 
establishment of a state is necessary to create a new state.”). 
 17. See Poore, supra note 15, at 136 (“[T]he theory holds that a state exists 
when four conditions are met, regardless of political recognition.”). 
 18. See Huang, supra note 10, at 116–18 (discussing the evolution of the 
declarative theory since the advent of the United Nations). 
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importance on the issue of recognition by other states.19 
The practical importance of recognitions has led to a second 
theory—the constitutive theory of statehood.20 Proponents of 
this theory assert that a state becomes a legal person once other 
nations recognize it as such.21 Recognition occurs when a nation 
publicly accepts the existence of the state.22 This theory, despite 
having fallen out of favor during the decades since World War II,23 
has lately enjoyed a modest resurgence.24 Nevertheless, critics 
argue that this approach leads to uncertainty, especially when 
some nations choose to recognize a state but others do not.25 
They also contend that it hinders the exercise of the right of self-
determination because it places more importance upon the 
judgment of the recognizing nation than upon the rights of the 
state exercising self-determination.26 
 
 19. See, e.g., William Thomas Worster, Law, Politics, and the Conception of the 
State in State Recognition Theory, 27 B.U. INT’L L.J. 115, 119 (2009) (discussing 
criticisms of the declarative theory, including that state practice may not support it 
and that recognition may be more important to statehood). 
 20. Id. at 118 (“The constitutive theory provides that a state is only a state 
upon the political act of recognition by other states.”). 
 21. See Poore, supra note 15, at 136. 
 22. See K. William Watson, When in the Course of Human Events: Kosovo’s 
Independence and the Law of Secession, 17 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 267, 288 (2008) 
(“An entity aspiring to the legal status of statehood effectively requires the 
acceptance of its potential peers.”). 
 23. See generally, Hersch Lauterpacht, Recognition of States in International 
Law, 53 YALE L.J. 385, 420 (1944) (“States . . . enter into legal relations with one 
another in conformity with their own will by virtue of the act of recognition. Prior to 
that act no relations of a legal nature can exist between them.” (citing G. W. F. 
Hegel, ENZYKLOPADIE DER PHILOSOPHISCHEN WISSENSCHAFTEN IM GRUNDRISSE 
§§ 545, 547 (Rosenkranz ed., 1870))). 
 24. See Worster, supra note 19, at 120. 
 25. Id. The current situation in Kosovo is one such example of this uncertainty. 
The issue of Kosovar secession is currently before the International Court of Justice, 
in light of the uncertainty caused by recognition by the U.S., U.K., and France 
(among others) and the refusal to recognize by countries like Serbia and Russia. 
G.A. Res. 63/3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/3 (Oct. 8, 2008), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=4&k=21&case=141&code=kos&p3=0; see also 
Christopher J. Borgen, The Language of the Law and the Practice of Politics: Great 
Powers and the Rhetoric of Self-Determination in the Cases of Kosovo and South 
Ossetia, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 6–7 (2009). 
 26. See Worster, supra note 19, at 120 (“Some have argued that the declaratory 
theory emerged because of objections to the discretion of states, as well as a 
principled acknowledgment of the role of self-determination.”). 
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B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL STANDARDS RELATED TO SELF-
DETERMINATION 
The modern concept of self-determination has its roots in a 
speech before Congress by President Woodrow Wilson in 1918.27 
In this speech, Wilson announced fourteen points for “a program 
of peace” that he felt would protect the world from a repeat of 
the horrors of the First World War.28 The fifth point stated that, 
when “determining . . . questions of sovereignty the interests of 
the populations concerned must have equal weight with the 
equitable claims of the government whose title is to be 
determined.”29 Citizens of a country, President Wilson argued 
elsewhere, had “a right to choose the sovereignty under which 
they shall live.”30 
Despite both the passage of nearly a century since 
President Wilson’s speech and the prominent status of the right 
to self-determination within various international treaties and 
instruments,31 no norm has emerged which comprehensively 
 
 27. The concept of self-determination, however, is older than Woodrow Wilson’s 
Fourteen Points. The French Revolution is one notable example of early self-
determination efforts. Borgen, supra note 25, at 4; see also Christopher J. Borgen, 
Imagining Sovereignty, Managing Secession: The Legal Geography of Eurasia’s 
“Frozen Conflicts”, 9 OR. REV. INT’L L. 477, 482–83 (2007) (detailing the rise of the 
self-determination concept during the early part of the 20th century). 
 28. President Woodrow Wilson, Address to Congress (Jan. 8, 1918) (“What we 
demand . . . is that the world . . . be made safe for every peace-loving nation. . . . All 
the peoples of the world are in effect partners in this interest. . . . The program of 
the world’s peace, therefore, is our program . . . .”). 
 29. Id. 
 30. President Woodrow Wilson, Gridiron Dinner Address (Feb. 26, 1916) in THE 
POLITICS OF WOODROW WILSON: SELECTIONS FROM HIS SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, at 
260 (August Heckscher ed., 1956). 
 31. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2 (“To develop friendly relations among 
nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.”); 
Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission: Opinions on Questions Arising 
From the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 2, July 4 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1488, 
1498 (1992) [hereinafter Badinter Commission] (“[T]he principle of the right to self-
determination serves to safeguard human rights.”); International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights art. 1(1), Dec. 16, 1988, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (“All 
peoples have the right of self-determination.”); International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights art. 1(1), Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (“All peoples have the 
right of self-determination.”); Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with 
the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., 
Supp. No. 28, at 122, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (Oct. 24 1970) [hereinafter Declaration on 
Friendly Relations] (“[A]ll peoples have the right freely to determine, without 
external interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development, and every state has the duty to respect this right . . . .”). 
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defines the scope of the right to self-determination.32 Numerous 
cases evince this lack of clarity—as in Indonesia, the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam, Algeria,33 and more recently, Kosovo and 
South Ossetia.34 Academic commentators also disagree as to the 
meaning of both the declarative and constitutive theories of self-
determination; some contend that a broad application is proper 
in order to reconcile international legal disputes, and others say 
that such theories serve no practical purpose other than as tools 
of analysis.35 
Notwithstanding the differing interpretations of the right to 
self-determination, three international legal principles have 
emerged in regard to nascent state sovereignty. The most 
established of the three principles holds that a colonized region 
has a right to self-determination—that is, a right to determine 
its future free from the interference of a colonizer.36 Today, 
because the pervasiveness of colonialism has dwindled since 
 
 32. See Peter Hilpold, What Role for Academic Writers in Interpreting 
International Law? A Rejoinder to Orakhelashvili, 8 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 291, 292 
(2009) (“[T]here can be no doubt that the law of self-determination is one of the most 
non-transparent areas of international law, in which the drafters of the relevant 
norms played with ambiguity and half-hearted concessions and denials.”); Jure 
Vidmar, International Legal Responses to Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence, 42 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 779, 808–09 (2009) (discussing the need to “clarify the 
ambiguities associated with the applicability of the right of self-determination in 
non-colonial contexts”). 
 33. See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
258–60 (1979) (detailing the self-determination efforts of each of the three countries, 
and how the self-determination efforts of each led to independence). 
 34. See Borgen, supra note 25, at 7 (discussing remaining questions regarding 
self-determination in the context of Kosovo and South Ossetia, including “what the 
scope of the right would be—who can claim a right to self-determination and what 
right does that entail?”). 
 35. The clearest example of this debate can be found in the series of articles 
and responses between Hilpold and Orakhelashvili. Compare Hilpold, supra note 32, 
at 292–93 (“The principle of self-determination is one of the most powerful 
intellectual tools allowing for changes in an otherwise static international 
community. . . . [I]t must be considered that the international community is formed 
by States holding widely different opinions on many issues, among them the right to 
self-determination.”) with Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Kosovo UDI between 
Agreed Law and Subjective Perception: A Response to Hilpold, 8 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 
285, 287 (2009) (“Theory in this particular context is valuable only to the extent that 
it conceptualizes the principle of self-determination as is actually accepted as part of 
international law; short of that, theory becomes little more than the advancement of 
one’s personal perception.”). 
 36. See Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 31, at 124 (citing the 
Declaration’s partial purpose “[t]o bring a speedy end to colonialism, having due 
regard to the freely expressed will of the peoples concerned”). 
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World War II under the influence of the United Nations,37 this 
method of self-determination has limited relevance.38 Second, 
international custom recognizes a right to internal self-
determination—that is, dissatisfied constituents have the right 
to use existing political processes as a tool for self-
determination.39 Finally, international custom also recognizes 
external self-determination—that is, secession.40 When secession 
occurs against the wishes of the parent state, it is rarely 
acknowledged.41 For example, the United Nations refuses to 
admit into membership states which have illegally seceded.42 
C. THOUGH THE LAW OF SECESSION IS NOT SETTLED, THREE 
METHODS OF SECESSION EXIST 
The law of secession remains largely unsettled, reflecting 
the ambiguity surrounding the law of self-determination. Case 
law over the last century fails to identify a definite standard 
that fully remedies this lack of clarity.43 Academic 
commentators disagree as to the applicability to secession of any 
of the legal standards of statehood and self-determination,44 and 
 
 37. See Pamela Epstein, Behind Closed Doors: “Autonomous Colonization” in 
Post United Nations Era—The Case for Western Sahara, 15 ANN. SURV. INT’L & 
COMP. L 107, 135–36 (2009) (“Member states [in the U.N.] are under a duty to bring 
about a speedy end to colonialism, including due regard for the freely expressed will 
of the peoples concerned.”). 
 38. See Vidmar, supra note 32, at 808. 
 39. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 282 (Can.) (“The 
recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self-determination 
of a people is normally fulfilled through internal self-determination—a people’s 
pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural development within the 
framework of an existing state.”); see also Borgen, supra note 25, at 9 (“[S]elf-
determination means the right to be free from external interference in its pursuit of 
its political, economic, and social goals.”). 
 40. Vidmar, supra note 32, at 814. 
 41. See id. at 809 (“[I]n the absence of a relevant constitutional provision or 
specific approval by a parent state, the question of secession is much more 
disputable.”). 
 42. See James Crawford, State Practice and International Law in Relation to 
Unilateral Secession, in SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: QUEBEC AND 
LESSONS LEARNED 31, 32 (Anne F. Bayefsky ed., 2000) (“Outside the colonial 
context, the United Nations is extremely reluctant to admit a seceding entity to 
membership against the wishes of the government of the state from which it has 
purported to secede. There is no case since 1945 where it has done so.”). 
 43. See, e.g., Report Presented by the Council of the League by the Commission 
of Rapporteurs, The Aaland Islands Question, League of Nations Council Doc. B7 
(1921) [hereinafter Aaland Islands Report]; see also Reference re Succession of 
Quebec, 2 S.C.R. at 277–78; Badinter Commission, supra note 31, at 1497–99. 
 44. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
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even whether secession is within the scope of international 
law.45 Most argue that secession falls foremost within the 
auspices of domestic law rather than international law.46 The 
use of domestic law to secure secession and independence is 
termed “bilateral” secession. In practice, two things can together 
justify bilateral secession: “a clear expression of democratic will” 
by those wishing to secede,47 and negotiations between the 
secessionists and the parent country.48 In this way, the parent 
country grants independence in response to democratic 
pressure, effectively justifying secession. 
When the parent state is unwilling to negotiate, however, 
the outcome is less clear. Certain historical cases indicate that a 
second “unilateral”49 or “remedial”50 method of secession is 
justified. The Aaland Islands Case in 192151 articulated the 
following requirements for justifiable secession when the parent 
state opposes it: 1) those wishing to secede were “a people”;52 2) 
they were subject to serious violations of human rights at the 
hands of the parent state; and 3) no other remedies were 
available to them.53 The Supreme Court of Canada applied a 
 
 45. Borgen, supra note 27, at 485 (“[I]nternational law is silent as to secession, 
which is viewed as a matter of domestic law and politics, not international law.”); 
Special Comm. on European Affairs of the N.Y. City Bar, Executive Summary: 
Thawing a Frozen Conflict: Legal Aspects of the Separatist Crisis in Moldova, 14 
ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 379, 383 (2008) [hereinafter Special Committee] 
(“[I]nternational law has little to say as to any supposed ‘right’ to autonomy.”). 
 46. See Borgen, supra note 25, at 8; see also Special Committee, supra note 45, 
at 383 (“[G]rants of ‘autonomy’ are largely issues of domestic law.”). 
 47. Reference re Succession of Quebec, 2 S.C.R. at, at 264–65. 
 48. Id. at 265–66. 
 49. Id. at 264 (describing this form of attempted secession as “unilateral”). 
 50. See, e.g., Vidmar, supra note 32, at 814–18 (describing the form of 
attempted secession as “remedial” when a parent state opposes it and is unwilling to 
negotiate). 
 51. This case concerned a collection of islands that were historically under 
Finnish control, through referendum, but sought to become Swedish. Aaland Islands 
Report, supra note 43, at 21. In this case, the League of Nations concluded that, as 
long as the people of the Aaland Islands were granted a measure of self-
determination, they had no right to secede from Finland and be annexed by Sweden. 
Id. at 29 (concluding that 1. the Aalanders deserve “protection and support” in their 
status as an ethnic minority; 2. annexation is not the only option in this case; and 3. 
the “Finnish State is ready to grant the inhabitants satisfactory guarantees and 
faithfully to observe the engagement which it will enter into with them”). 
 52. The definition of “people” is somewhat ambiguous. See Vidmar, supra note 
32, at 810–12. Nonetheless, “the term ‘people’ has been used to signify citizens of a 
nation-state, the inhabitants in a specific territory being decolonized by a foreign 
power, and ethnic groups.” Borgen, supra note 25, at 7–8. 
 53. Borgen, supra note 25, at 8. 
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similar standard in its decision on the secession of the Province 
of Quebec in 1998.54 If a state seeking independence can present 
evidence of these factors, most commentators would argue it 
likely has a basis for justifiable secession.55 
Finally, the secessionists may attempt to secede by simply 
declaring themselves independent from a parent state.56 This 
occurs without a blessing from the parent state or justification 
under the unilateral standard discussed above.57 Such de facto 
secession is the most difficult to justify and may in fact be 
unjustifiable.58 Some suggest that the only possibility for 
justification in the case of de facto secession occurs through 
recognition of the secessionists’ independence by other nations.59 
This can be especially difficult because, as one commentator has 
noted, it is not “easy to formulate any satisfactory test for 
determining the statehood of the seceding entity before its 
complete success.” That is, there is no way to analyze claims to 
statehood until secessionists have successfully separated from 
their parent state.60 
E. POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS OBSCURE THE LEGAL PRINCIPLES 
SURROUNDING SECESSION 
In practice, application of the legal theories of secession is 
rarely as precise as each of the theories discussed above might 
indicate. This is because, in addition to the legal considerations, 
politics often gets involved.61 Given the often-unclear nature of 
 
 54. Reference re Succession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 281, 284–86 (Can.) 
(laying out three requirements including that the seceding group are a “people,” 
“governed as part of a colony, or subject to alien subjugation, domination or 
exploitation,” and when it is deprived of “the meaningful exercise of its right to self-
determination”). 
 55. See Milena Sterio, On the Right to External Self-Determination: 
“Selfistans,” Secession, and the Great Powers’ Rule, 19 MINN. J. INT’L L. 137, 145–46 
(2010) (discussing the current norms regarding unilateral, or remedial, secession). 
 56. See Vidmar, supra note 32, 818. 
 57. See id. at 817–18. 
 58. Cf. Reference re Succession of Quebec, 2 S.C.R. at 296 (“[R]ecognition, even 
if granted, would not, however, provide any retroactive justification for the act of 
secession.”). 
 59. This, of course, presupposes a system that assigns significant legal weight 
to acts of recognition, as in the constitutive theory of statehood. Id. (“The ultimate 
success of such a secession would be dependent on recognition by the international 
community.”). 
 60. Crawford, supra note 33, at 262. 
 61. See Sterio, supra note 55, at 140 (arguing that the current norm of external 
self-determination “inappropriately mixes the legal with the political realms”). 
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the legal principles of secession, and given the absence of any 
governing international legal body,62 political incentives often 
play a more significant role than legal norms in motivating 
states to recognize seceding territories as independent states.63 
The influence of politics on the legal issue of self-
determination makes the successful exercise of this right more 
difficult,64 and possibly arbitrary,65 for less influential nations. 
There is evidence that, in practice, in addition to meeting the 
legal requirements of secession, secessionists must also gain the 
approval of a powerful nation in order for legitimacy.66 Some 
argue that the problem with the latter step is that it depends 
entirely on the will and motives of the powerful nation,67 as 
opposed to the legal soundness of the secessionists’ claims to 
self-determination.68 At least one commentator suggests that 
this practice makes the sovereignty of less-powerful nations 
slightly less important than that of more-powerful nations.69 
 
 62. Richard N. Haass, Pondering Primacy, 4 GEO. J. INT’L AFF. 91, 92 (2003) 
(“[T]here is no single source of authority or legitimacy . . . . [T]he United Nations is 
not yet at the point where it alone can decide what is legitimate and what is not.”). 
 63. Sterio, supra note 55, at 170 (“Finally, the self-determination-seeking 
people must prove that external actors, including the Great Powers, view its 
struggle as legitimate and are ready to embrace it as a new sovereign power. I allege 
that this ultimate criterion is the most important one, and that it routinely 
determines the fate of various peoples struggling for the recognition of their rights 
across the globe.”). Sterio uses the term “Great Powers” to refer to the “most 
powerful nations.” See id. at 137. 
 64. Id. at 172 (“[I]f peoples are seeking to separate from a Great Power, as in 
the case of Chechnya struggling to gain independence from Russia, their quest for 
self-determination will most likely fail. . . . The Great Powers seem to be immune 
from pressures of self-determination, and their borders are unlikely to yield to 
secessionist movements.”). 
 65. Id. at 174 (arguing that strong nations will “choose to support [self-
determination] . . . only when their own interests are served by such exercise of 
external self-determination by a specific people”). 
 66. See id. at 173–74 (contrasting the situations of Kosovo and East Timor, 
both of which had support from powerful nations as they seceded, with the 
situations of Chechnya, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia, all of which currently are in 
opposition with the interests of powerful nations). 
 67. Id. at 173 (“[I]t is the Great Powers’ support, or lack thereof, toward a 
people’s struggle for self-determination that determines the outcome of such a 
struggle.”). 
 68. See id. at 175 (“The legal criteria for the external self-determination have 
become somewhat mooted by the necessity to obtain the political support of the 
Great Powers for any struggling on our planet.”). 
 69. Id. (“[T]he rule by the Great Powers inherently undermines state equality 
and the entire sovereignty-based system of global international relations.”). 
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E. DEFERENCE TO TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY 
Though the right of self-determination is highly regarded 
within international law, various international documents 
attest to the fact that the right to territorial integrity is at least 
as important a right—Article 2 of the United Nations Charter is 
foremost among these documents.70 Though some commentators 
have called for a relaxation of the current standards protecting 
territorial integrity,71 the majority view defers to the existing 
laws as codified in various international legal instruments.72 
Related to the issue of territorial integrity is the principle of 
uti possidetis juris: “The right to self-determination must not 
involve changes to existing frontiers at the time of 
independence.”73 The original purpose of this doctrine was to 
maintain the borders of former colonies upon decolonization.74 
The Badinter Commission, created in 1991 to find solutions for 
the problems in the Balkans,75 utilized this doctrine in its 
management of the dissolution of former Yugoslavia.76 In that 
case, the Commission concluded that uti possidetis juris had a 
broader meaning, implying that it also applied in instances of 
 
 70. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity 
or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations.”); see also, Vienna Convention on the Succession of 
States in Respect of Treaties, pmbl., done Aug. 23, 1978, 1946 U.N.T.S 3 (recalling 
the territorial protections observed by the United Nations Charter); Declaration on 
Friendly Relations, supra note 31, at art. 1 (“The territorial integrity and political 
independence of the State are inviolable.”); Montevideo Convention, supra note 11, 
at art. 11 (“[T]he territory of a state is inviolable.”).  
 71. See Thomas M. Franck, Opinion Directed at Question 2 of the Reference, in 
SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: QUEBEC AND LESSONS LEARNED 75, 
82 (Anne Bayefsky ed., 2000) (arguing that the respect for territorial integrity is less 
observed than the multitude of international legal instruments make it seem). 
 72. See Borgen, supra note 25, at 8 (“[T]erritorial integrity of states [is] a 
cornerstone of the UN framework as stated in Article (2) of the Charter.”); 
Orakhelashvili, supra note 35, at 288 (“If the policies consistently accepted as 
fundamental by the international community, namely the principle of territorial 
integrity of States, are violated on certain occasions under the pressure of political 
will, they will, sooner or later, be violated on other occasions as well.”). 
 73. Malcolm N. Shaw, Peoples, Territorialism and Boundaries, 8 EUR. J. OF 
INT’L L. 478, 482 (1997). 
 74. For a broader discussion of uti possidetis juris, see Frontier Dispute (Burk. 
Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 565 (Dec. 22). 
 75. Richard Falk, Self-Determination Under International Law: The Coherence 
of Doctrine Versus the Incoherence of Experience, in THE SELF-DETERMINATION OF 
PEOPLES: COMMUNITY, NATION, AND STATE IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD 52 
(Wolfgang F. Danspeckgruber, ed. 2002). 
 76. See Badinter Commission, supra note 31, at 1498. 
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self-determination unrelated to decolonization, as was the 
situation in Yugoslavia.77  
F. THE SEARCH FOR AN OBJECTIVE TEST OF STATE FAILURE 
There are many conceptions of “state failure,” most of which 
are derived from classical definitions of statehood.78 Most 
commentators agree that failed states arise when a government 
loses its ability to govern.79 Also important in the definition of a 
failed state is the loss of its legitimacy.80 Some commentators 
also emphasize the failed state’s inability to “sustain[ ] itself as a 
member of the international community.”81 
The study of failed states has produced a variety of tests 
aimed at creating an objective test for determining “failure.” The 
foci of these tests vary, but many emphasize the importance of 
governmentally enforced security,82 including physical security 
from violence83 and economic security.84 Only through security 
 
 77. See id. (“However, it is well established that, whatever the circumstances, 
the right to self-determination must not involve changes to existing frontiers at the 
time of independence (uti possidetis juris) except where the States concerned agree 
otherwise.”). 
 78. See generally Jonathon Di John, Conceptualising the Causes and 
Consequences of Failed States: A Critical Review of the Literature 3–10 (Crisis States 
Research Centre, Working Paper No. 25, 2008), available at 
http://www.crisisstates.com/download/wp/wpSeries2/wp25.2.pdf (discussing the link 
between the historical conceptions of Hobbes, Machiavelli, and Weber, and the 
current analyses of failed states corresponding to the theories of those writers). 
 79. See I. William Zartman, Introduction: Posing the Problem of State Collapse, 
in COLLAPSED STATES: THE DISINTEGRATION AND RESTORATION OF LEGITIMATE 
AUTHORITY 1, 1 (I. William Zartman ed., 1995) (“[‘Failed State’] refers to a situation 
where the structure, authority (legitimate power), law, and political order have 
fallen apart . . . . For a period, the state itself, as a legitimate, functioning order, is 
gone.”). 
 80. Robert I. Rotberg, Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and 
Indicators, in STATE FAILURE AND STATE WEAKNESS IN A TIME OF TERROR 1, 9 
(Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2003). 
 81. Gerald B. Helman & Steven R. Ratner, Saving Failed States, FOREIGN 
POLICY, Winter 1992–93, at 3 (discussing the “disturbing new phenomenon [that] is 
emerging: the failed nation-state, utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member 
of the international community”). 
 82. See Rotberg, supra note 80, at 6; Di John, supra note 78, at 9 (citing Crisis 
States Research Center, CRISIS STATES WORKSHOP (2006) available at 
http://www.crisisstates.com/download/drc/FailedState.pdf); Fund for Peace, 
Methodology Behind CAST, http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/ 
index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=107&Itemid=145 (last visited Mar. 2, 2010). 
 83. See Fund for Peace, supra note 82. 
 84. See Liana Sun Wyler, Weak and Failing States: Evolving Security Threats 
and U.S. Policy, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, app. A (2007), available at 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAB679.pdf (defining a failed state as one which is 
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can a country gain political independence.85 And through 
political independence comes strong leadership from a 
legislative or executive power, both of which aid in stabilizing a 
country.86 The existence of an independent judiciary87 and the 
significance of the rule of law88 are also elements often 
considered in tests for failure. Notably, at least one test includes 
a time element—arguing that a state has failed only once a 
power vacuum has existed for several years.89 
G. THE HISTORY OF SOMALIA AND SOMALILAND’S PUSH FOR 
SECESSION 
Until 1960, Somaliland, a northern region of modern day 
Somalia, was a colony under the British Empire.90 Five days 
after Britain granted the colony independence91 it united with 
the southern half of modern day Somalia,92 which had recently 
gained independence from Italy.93 Political turmoil between 
various clans and regions within the country tainted the 
unification process.94 Nevertheless, a nationalistic fervor for a 
“Greater Somalia” drove this effort onward.95 Over time, the 
 
“unable or unwilling to assure the provision of vital services to significant parts of 
its territory”). 
 85. See Rotberg, supra note 80, at 3; Fund for Peace, supra note 82. 
 86. See Fund for Peace, supra note 82. 
 87. See Rotberg, supra note 80, at 6; Fund for Peace, supra note 82. 
 88. See Rotberg, supra note 80, at 3; Fund for Peace, supra note 82. 
 89. See Di John, supra note 78, at 9–10 (discussing one formulation, a 
requirement of which is that the authority of the government has been absent for 
several years). 
 90. See Richard W. Rahn, Curious Case of Somaliland, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 6, 
2005, at A16. 
 91. See id. 
 92. Said S. Samatar, Historical Setting, in SOMALIA: A COUNTRY STUDY 1, 26 
(Helen Chapin Metz ed., 1992). 
 93. Id. at 20. Italy ruled the southern half of Somalia prior to World War II, 
and though it maintained conditional control over the country after the war, it was 
only temporary. By U.N. agreement, Italy controlled the region for only ten more 
years until 1960, when it ceded full control to the Somali people. See id. at 14–15, 
20. 
 94. See id. at 27 (citing the north’s concern over the democratic power of the 
south, most clearly demonstrated by a constitutional referendum in 1961 which 
passed but without a majority in the north). 
 95. See I.M. Lewis, Pan-Africanism and Pan-Somalism, 1 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 
147, 147–51 (1963) (discussing the cultural and historical impetus behind the efforts 
for a unified Somalia); see also Samatar, supra note 92, at 28 (explaining that the 
catalyst behind the movement for a “Greater Somalia” was the desire to protect 
historical territorial integrity from the other newly independent colonies in the 
region). 
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infighting subsided somewhat, allowing for the establishment of 
a functioning democratic government,96 and the northern and 
southern regions of the country remained unified for the rest of 
the 1960s.97 
In 1969, however, General Mohammed Siad Barre 
engineered a successful coup and became president, effectively 
ending democratic rule.98 One of his aims was to inject 
modernity into Somali society by replacing its traditional and 
cultural underpinnings.99 His methods, described by some as an 
amalgamation of Soviet orthodoxy and the teachings of the 
Qur’an,100 and which he termed “scientific socialism,”101 
included suppression of the ancient clan system,102 an emphasis 
on central planning of the economy,103 and extreme violence 
against opposition groups.104 Siad Barre maintained his grip 
over the country through the 1980s, losing control only after the 
commencement of the civil war that continues today.105 
Because of the civil war that began in 1991 and continues 
today, the conditions in Somalia are anarchic.106 At least one 
study has listed the country at the top of the list of “failed 
states.”107 There is virtually no government presence in the 
 
 96. See NINA J. FITZGERALD, SOMALIA: ISSUES, HISTORY AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 34 
(2002) (discussing the attribute of the Western style democracy that developed 
throughout the early years of Somali independence, including high voter 
participation rates and universal suffrage). 
 97. Rahn, supra note 90, at A16; see also Draper, supra note 1, at 76–77 
(discussing indicators of the newly unified Somalia’s growing stability throughout 
the 1960s, including political development, growth of its international ties, and 
domestic self-reliance). 
 98. FITZGERALD, supra note 96, at 34–35. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id.; see also ROBERT G. PATMAN, THE SOVIET UNION IN THE HORN OF 
AFRICA: THE DIPLOMACY OF INTERVENTION AND DISENGAGEMENT 118 (1990). 
 101. See PATMAN, supra note 100, at 117–18. 
 102. FITZGERALD, supra note 96, at 34. 
 103. 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE DEVELOPING WORLD 1405 (Thomas M. Leonard 
ed., 2006). 
 104. See Samatar, supra note 92, at 50–52 (describing the brutalities committed 
by the Siad Barre regime against the opposition clans—the Majeerteen, the Isaaq 
and the Hawiye—including various massacres (including of women and children), 
mass rape, spoilage of natural resources, and immense destruction of personal 
property). 
 105. Rahn, supra note 90, at A16. 
 106. See id.; Daniel Howden, Africa’s Best Kept Secret, INDEPENDENT (London), 
May 6, 2006, at 22. 
 107. See generally The Fund for Peace, FAILED STATES INDEX 2009, available at 
http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/. Somalia has failed more significantly than even 
Sudan, Iraq, and Afghanistan, three of the most prominent recent examples of 
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southern part of Somalia.108 Al-Qaeda-backed groups have 
gained a foothold in the region and these groups perpetuate a 
vicious cycle of instability in two ways. They suppress the 
populace with daily violence,109 and use economic and religious 
incentives to lure young Somali males into the only steady jobs 
available—as foot soldiers in the civil war.110 
The official government of Somalia, the Somali Transitional 
Government,111 has no real control or influence over the day-to-
day affairs of the country.112 Though the government controls 
parts of Mogadishu,113 the rest of Somalia is controlled by clans, 
pirates, and al-Shabaab,114 a fundamentalist Muslim terror 
group.115 The Transitional Government receives financial 
support from the United States and the African Union has 
pledged financial and military aid.116 Nevertheless, much of this 
aid remains undelivered and Somalia’s nearest neighbors are 
reluctant to get involved in the instability.117 
In the north, in Somaliland, however, the situation is 
markedly different. Relative to the atmosphere of the rest of the 
country, Somaliland is a portrait of stability.118 A few rocky 
years after declaring their independence from Somalia in 
1991,119 the northern clans came together, deciding to give up 
violence and resolve the differences that had ignited under the 
 
extreme state disaster. Id. 
 108. Howden, supra note 106, at 22. 
 109. See Draper, supra note 1, at 87. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 76. 
 112. Abdinasir Mohammed & Sarah Childress, Suicide Bombing Kills Somalia 
Ministers, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 2009, at A11. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Al-Shabaab’s role in the stability of the country has evolved over the last 
several years. In 2006 it acted as a governmentally sanctioned militia. Once that 
government collapsed, al-Shabaab became a destabilizing force in the country, 
responsible for multiple suicide bombings. As the current government has waned, al-
Shabaab has again increased its influence in the country, perhaps even controlling 
elements of the government. See id.; see also Somalia and Its Jihadists: A 
Government under the Cosh, ECONOMIST, June 27, 2009, at 56. 
 116. Mohammed & Childress, supra note 112, at A11. 
 117. See Somalia and Its Jihadists, supra note 115, at 56 (“Kenya and Ethiopia 
are loth to step in. . . . [T]he Shabab says it ‘will destroy the tall glass buildings in 
Nairobi’ unless Kenya pulls its troops back from the border.”). 
 118. Draper, supra note 1, at 86. 
 119. Despite the declaration of independence, little has changed politically for 
the region, especially as regards their position within the sphere of international 
relations—though they do maintain some autonomy over their own affairs. See 
Baldauf, supra note 7, at 6. 
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Siad regime.120 Today, violence is rare.121 Somaliland has 
engaged in efforts to combat the systemic instability in the 
south.122 There are even signs of basic economic development in 
the capital city of Hargeysa.123 Perhaps most importantly for the 
long-term stability of the region, Somaliland observes a rough 
form of Western-style democracy.124 Despite some lingering 
problems,125 Somaliland has become a relatively stable, 
autonomous region.126 
Somaliland’s leaders actively promote its secession from 
Somalia.127 They cite their region’s recent history of stability, its 
democratic government, and the failure of the Somali state in 
support of their claims.128 A few commentators have also argued 
for Somaliland’s formal independence, both as a matter of law 
and as a matter of international public policy.129 However, 
 
 120. See Draper, supra note 1, at 86. 
 121. Id. 
 122. See Trying to Behave like a Proper State, ECONOMIST, Oct. 1, 2005, at 43–44 
(detailing the circumstances surrounding the arrest of seven al-Qaeda members for 
a plot to assassinate “leaders and foreign aid workers”). 
 123. See Draper, supra note 1, at 86 (“Somaliland’s capital city of Hargeysa is an 
almighty wreck of sledgehammered streets, ungoverned traffic, litter, and refugee 
camps, but there are two things you will not find in Mogadishu . . . a construction 
boom . . . [and] currency-exchange booths everywhere on the streets . . . .”). 
 124. See Baldauf, supra note 7, at 6; see also The Nation Nobody Knows, supra 
note 9, at 42. Somaliland’s government has a bicameral legislature of sorts—the 
upper house consists of clan elders and the lower of democratically elected 
representatives. Id.; see also Howdens, supra note 106, at 22. In 2009, Somaliland 
was due for its first presidential election since 2003, but disagreements have 
postponed it several times. See Matt Brown, Somaliland Readies for Presidential 
Election, NAT’L (Abu Dhabi), Oct. 20, 2009, http://www.thenational.ae/apps/ 
pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20091021/FOREIGN/710209864/1135. 
 125. Since October of 2008, as many as thirty suicide bombings (presumably 
carried out by terror cells associated with al-Qaeda, such as al-Shabaab) have killed 
several Somalilanders, challenging the stability of the region. See Al-Qaeda on the 
March, ECONOMIST, May 23, 2009, at 48. Though the government is a functioning 
democracy, it struggles with political corruption. See, e.g., Somaliland Stability 
‘Under Threat,’ BBC NEWS, Oct. 8, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/ 
8292773.stm (last visited Mar. 30, 2010) (“[T]he presidential election . . . was due to 
have been held on 27 September. This is not the first time the vote has been 
delayed . . . .”). Finally, certain human rights issues remain unresolved—for 
instance, female genital mutilation affects as many as 95% of Somali women. U.N. 
Children’s Fund [UNICEF], Advocacy Paper, Eradication of Female Genital 
Mutilation (2004), available at http://www.unicef.org/somalia/ 
SOM_FGM_Advocacy_Paper.pdf. 
 126. See Draper, supra note 1, at 86. 
 127. Id. at 86–87. 
 128. See id. at 86; Baldauf, supra note 7, at 6; Howden, supra note 106, at 22.  
 129. See, e.g., Alison K. Eggers, Note, When is a State a State? The Case for the 
Recognition of Somaliland, 30 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 211, 222 (2007) (arguing 
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though many countries maintain relationships with the region, 
no country officially recognizes Somaliland’s existence 
independent of Somalia.130 
II. UNDER CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
SOMALILAND HAS NO CLAIMS TO INDEPENDENCE 
A. MERELY SATISFYING THE REQUIREMENTS OF STATEHOOD IS 
INADEQUATE TO JUSTIFY SECESSION 
Some contend that Somaliland meets the requirements of 
statehood, and that for this reason, is already independent of 
Somalia.131 The legality of such a claim depends upon an 
evaluation of the legal status of Somaliland using the 
declarative or constitutive theory of statehood. The constitutive 
theory of statehood requires recognition by other states and 
international organizations, and the applicability of the 
declarative theory is contingent upon several social, 
geographical, and political factors. 
1. The Constitutive Theory 
Under the constitutive theory of statehood, Somaliland 
could meet the requirements of statehood upon recognition of 
independence by other nations or international bodies.132 It is 
unclear how this theory would apply in practice to the case of 
Somaliland. What actions are sufficient to indicate 
recognition?133 What are the legal implications if some states 
recognize a region but others refuse to offer recognition?134 How 
 
that because Somaliland meets international legal standards for “statehood” it 
should be recognized as a state); Poore, supra note 15, at 124 (arguing that 
Somaliland might have never actually united with Somalia in the 1960s and 
therefore can justifiably declare itself an independent state). 
 130. See Draper, supra note 1, at 86. 
 131. See Eggers, supra note 129, at 219–20. 
 132. See generally Poore, supra note 15, at 136 (discussing broadly the 
requirements of the constitutive theory of statehood). 
 133. Worster, supra note 19, at 135 (“Even the practice of state recognition can 
be opaque in terms of what acts may constitute recognition. Practice, in terms of 
seeking legitimacy in either theory, evolves.”). 
 134. Compare id. at 168 (discussing the “classic constitutive theory,” which “says 
that the state exists only upon recognition since it is a purely legal creation of rights 
and obligations, yet the other states have no constraints on them in law in 
recognizing the purported state”), with Vidmar, supra note 32, at 827–28 (arguing 
that “the situation in which one state may be recognized by some states, but not by 
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much discretion do existing states have in their duty to 
recognize other states?135 Despite differing views as to the 
minimum requirements under the constitutive theory, even 
under the most liberal standards of recognition, Somaliland’s 
relationships with other nations are not significant enough to 
constitute recognition. Currently, no nations or international 
bodies formally recognize Somaliland’s statehood.136 They will 
not interact with Somaliland as a sovereign state,137 nor will 
they circumvent the Somali Transitional Government to 
interact on a political level with the region.138 In short, 
Somaliland is unable to engage in official relations with other 
nations, who are concerned about the political ramifications of 
recognizing a breakaway state.139 
2. The Declarative Theory 
Under the declarative theory of statehood, a region attains 
statehood by declaring itself a state,140 by having a permanent 
population, by having a defined territory, by having a 
government, and by having the capacity to enter into relations 
with other states.141 Considering each of these factors, 
 
others, is an evident problem and thus a great deficiency of the constitutive theory”). 
 135. Compare Worster, supra note 19, at 153 (discussing the argument 
defending state discretion, stating that that “there is no reason why it should be 
unacceptable for states to ignore other purported states”), with CRAWFORD, supra 
note 33, at 23 (emphasizing the importance of recognition–that “it might be argued 
that recognition . . . is central rather than peripheral . . . .”). 
 136. See Draper, supra note 1, at 86. 
 137. Id. (“[N]o government has recognized [Somaliland] as a sovereign nation.”); 
The Nation Nobody Knows, supra note 9, at 42. 
 138. See The Nation Nobody Knows, supra note 9, at 42 (“Saudi Arabia . . . is 
firm friends with the transitional government in Somalia, which maintains that 
Somaliland remains within its orbit.”); Abdullahi Del, Letter to the Editor, WASH. 
TIMES, Jan. 11, 2005, at A16 (discussing reasons why the United States is interested 
in supporting the aims of the Somali Transitional Government: “[T]he government of 
Somalia is very aggressive in supporting Western standards in all phases of 
governance, economic development and fighting terrorism. Somalia is strategically 
located and has the strategic resources and desire to become a great friend to the 
United States.”); Howden, supra note 106, at 22 (“The UK recognised Somaliland at 
independence in 1960 but London would have to upset powerful allies to renew that 
step.”). 
 139. See Rahn, supra note 90, at A16. 
 140. Poore, supra note 15, at 136; see also Huang, supra note 10, at 126–27; 
Montevideo Convention, supra note 11, at art. 3. 
 141. See Montevideo Convention, supra note 11, at art. 1; Carsten Thomas 
Ebenroth & Matthew James Kemner, The Enduring Political Nature of Questions of 
State Succession and Secession and the Quest for Objective Standards, 17 U. PA. J. 
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Somaliland has a colorable argument that it meets the 
theoretical requirements of statehood. Somaliland’s population 
is relatively stable, unlike in the south, which has suffered a 
steady exodus of refugees since the civil war began.142 
Somaliland’s borders from its days as a British colony still serve 
as a hypothetical line of demarcation, albeit informally and 
without legal effect because of its unification with Somalia in 
1960.143 Somaliland can point to the relative success of several 
peaceful local elections as evidence of the existence of 
government.144 Finally, as previously discussed, although no 
nation recognizes Somaliland, it still maintains some informal 
contacts with other nations.145 On these bases, Somaliland 
appears to have a strong claim to statehood. 
At least one commentator on the issue of Somaliland’s 
independence has argued that because it meets the 
requirements of the declarative theory, Somaliland deserves 
independence.146 However, it is one thing to suggest that a 
region satisfies theoretical requirements of statehood, but quite 
another to argue that this constitutes a legal basis for 
independence. There is no legal precedent indicating that the 
four requirements of statehood are a prima facie basis for 
 
INT’L ECON. L. 753, 807–08 (1996) (“At times, the United Nations has admitted as 
members and the international community has recognized states that failed to meet 
each of the four characteristics. Nevertheless, compliance with these factors is 
usually required for statehood.”). 
 142. See Steve Bloomfield, Somalia War-Refugee Crisis Surpasses Darfur in its 
Horror, INDEPENDENT (London), Nov. 22, 2007, at 34 (discussing the impact of the 
refugee crisis in Somalia—estimating that as many as 600,000 people have fled from 
the capital city of Mogadishu). 
 143. Somaliland’s most notable border dispute is with the neighboring region of 
Puntland, a region that also wishes to break away from Somalia. They disagree as to 
the location of the border between them. See Somalia’s Puntland Sold Exploration 
Rights in Somaliland, AFROL NEWS, Feb. 1, 2006, available at 
http://www.afrol.com/articles/17937 (discussing contracts that Puntland granted to 
foreign companies for mineral exploration on soil that Somaliland claims as its own). 
 144. See Baldauf, supra note 7, at 6; The Nation Nobody Knows, supra note 9, at 
42. For example, in 2003 the country held a peaceful presidential election in which 
the margin of victory was only eighty votes. Rahn, supra note 90, at A16. 
 145. See, e.g., Eggers, supra note 129, at 219; The Nation Nobody Knows, supra 
note 9, at 42. The government of Ethiopia has invited officials in the Somaliland 
government to attend celebrations for the 105th anniversary of the establishment of 
Ethiopia’s second capital, Diredawa. See Ethiopia Invites Somaliland Parliament 
Leaders, SOMALILAND TIMES, Nov. 28, 2009, available at 
http://www.somalilandtimes.net/sl/2009/409/3.shtml.  
 146. See Eggers, supra note 129, at 222 (“Somaliland has operated as an 
independent state for fifteen years and as it meets international legal standards for 
‘statehood’ is, in fact, a state.”). 
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independence. Such a precedent would be disastrous to the idea 
of state sovereignty.147 Any region the least bit dissatisfied with 
its government and able to meet the requirements of the 
declarative theory of statehood could legally declare 
independence from its parent state.148 If there is a legal 
justification for Somaliland’s independence from Somalia, it 
cannot be simply because it meets the four theoretical 
requirements and it declares its statehood. 
B. THE SCOPE OF SOMALILAND’S RIGHT TO EXERCISE SELF-
DETERMINATION 
The proponents of independence for Somaliland argue for a 
broad construction of the right to self-determination—that is, 
that the people of Somaliland should have a right to form a 
country independent of Somalia.149 The first justification that 
Somaliland might claim lies in its history as a British colony. A 
colony has a legal right to exercise self-determination 
independent of its colonizer.150 Some make the argument that 
Somaliland, as a former colony, may exercise its right to self-
determination because it has not yet done so, despite gaining 
independence in 1960.151 When Somaliland joined Somalia in 
1960 to create a “Greater Somalia,” there was no national 
referendum or popular vote on the matter.152 Because there was 
no national vote, proponents of this position contend that 
unification of the north and south parts of Somalia was 
invalid.153 “If there was no union, then Somaliland still exists as 
an independent entity, and discussions pertaining to secession 
 
 147. See generally Huang, supra note 10, at 111–12 (discussing, within the 
context of Taiwan’s statehood efforts, the requirements of statehood, including the 
additional “indispensible” requirement of sovereignty). 
 148. For example, a U.S. state like Minnesota meets the requirements of 
statehood under the declarative theory: it has a permanent population, a defined 
territory, a government, and could reasonably enter into relations with other 
nations, if other nations opted to recognize Minnesota’s statehood. Under that logic, 
Minnesota could legally declare its independence from the United States. Cf. Huang, 
supra note 10, at 112 (discussing “exclusive sovereignty and the legal right to govern 
a territory under international law” as the factors that lend legitimacy to claims of 
statehood). 
 149. See generally Poore, supra note 15, at 146–47 (arguing that in Somaliland’s 
case, the burden of justifying unilateral self-determination is lower). 
 150. See Declaration of Friendly Relations, supra note 31, at 124; Epstein, supra 
note 37, at 135–36. 
 151. See Poore, supra note 15, at 140–42. 
 152. Id. at 140–41; see also Samatar, supra note 92, at 26. 
 153. See Poore, supra note 15, at 140. 
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are moot.”154 
Several problems call this argument into question. It 
ignores the fact that Somaliland and Somalia did formally agree 
to unite in 1960; though there was no national vote on the issue, 
democratically elected leaders of each former colony oversaw the 
unification process.155 These leaders did not act contrary to the 
will of the people. Rather, they acted in response to a surge of 
Somali nationalism and anti-colonialism in both the northern 
and southern parts of the country.156 Even if we accept the 
argument that the unification of 1960 is invalid because it 
lacked a popular referendum, this argument overlooks the 
decade following unification in which both the northern and 
southern parts of Somalia existed together as a relatively stable 
and vibrant democracy.157 The two decades under the Siad 
Barre regime were far from tranquil. The entire country, the 
north as well as the south, was oppressed by this brutal 
regime.158 The fact that the country faced oppression during this 
period should have no bearing on whether it actually unified 
upon decolonization. Because the north and south freely united 
upon independence, the argument that Somaliland retains the 
right to exercise self-determination is tenuous. 
The second way that Somaliland could exercise its right to 
self-determination is through internal self-determination, by 
using Somalia’s established political procedures and 
mechanisms of self-rule to realize its policy goals. The 
circumstances in Somalia, however, make it difficult for 
 
 154. Id. 
 155. See generally Samatar, supra note 92, at 25–28 (discussing the 
development of democracy in the united Somalia throughout the 1960s, including 
the adoption of universal suffrage, the formation of governmental organizations, and 
a lively political culture). Id. at 26 (“In April 1960, leaders of the two territories met 
in Mogadishu and agreed to form a unitary state.”). 
 156. Id. at 25–26 (“Political protests forced Britain in 1956 to introduce 
representative government in its protectorate and to accept the eventual unification 
of British Somaliland with southern Somalia . . . . Popular demand compelled the 
leaders of the two territories to proceed with plans for immediate unification.”); 
Draper, supra note 1, at 78 (“In 1960 the colonial powers departed, and a dreamy 
nationalism seized the Somali people. With visions of a unified country, Somaliland 
and Somalia confederated.”). 
 157. See Samatar, supra note 92, at 26. 
 158. See generally id. at 48–49 (discussing the repressive actions of the Said 
Barre regime against the clans of Somalia). One might argue that, under the Siad 
Barre regime, Somaliland had no choice but to be part of Somalia. This argument, 
however, overlooks the entire decade of the 1960s, before Siad Barre came to power, 
in which the country was, for the most part, a relatively peaceful Western-style 
democracy. Id. at 26. 
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Somaliland to exercise internal self-determination. In fact, any 
region within a failed state may have little or no opportunity to 
petition its government in the furtherance of self-determination, 
simply because it lacks a functioning government. In the case of 
Somalia, because of the civil war and the political turbulence it 
has caused, Somaliland has had no opportunity to use the 
Somali political process since 1991 when the civil war began.159 
Some commentators argue that Somaliland’s inability to 
exercise internal self-determination is strong enough support for 
the claim that Somaliland has the right to separate from 
Somalia.160 Somaliland is entitled to independence, they argue, 
because, as a failed state, its claim is distinguishable from other 
secessionist claims.161 Under existing legal norms, this 
argument is insufficient—there is a difference between a right 
to self-determination and a broad right to independence.162 
Some commentators even suggest that the apparatus of internal 
self-determination may act as an “organizing principle” within a 
failed state, giving citizens—with assistance from the 
international community—the control and authority to bring 
order out of the chaos within their country163 as opposed to 
 
 159. See generally Draper, supra note 1, at 78 (“In 1991 militias . . . chased 
[General Siad] Barre out of Mogadishu. The Somali people, weary of occupiers and 
strongmen, awaited the next iteration of government. Eighteen years later, they are 
still waiting.”). It is important to note that the government of a state may not take 
away the right to internal self-determination. See Sterio, supra note 55, at 145–46 
(discussing the primary importance of the right to internal self-determination and 
suggesting that an argument for secession becomes much stronger if the parent 
state fails to grant the right to internal self-determination). 
 160. Poore, supra note 15, at 143 (“In fact, Somalilanders have been irreversibly 
deprived of their right to internal self-determination and should not be forced to 
remain shackled to the failed state of Somalia.”). 
 161. Id. (“Proponents believe Somaliland’s case is distinguishable from the 
overwhelming majority of secessionist claims . . . .”). 
 162. See Nicola Bunick, Note, Chechnya: Access Denied, 40 GEO. J. INT’L L. 985, 
1013–14 (2009) (“As a result, the Chechens, like all ‘people’ are entitled to internal 
self-determination. However, a right to internal self-determination is far from a 
right to independence, or even autonomy. It is merely the threshold requirement for 
consideration of more sweeping entitlements.”). 
 163. See Gregory H. Fox, Self-Determination in the Post-Cold War Era: A New 
Internal Focus?, 16 MICH. J. INT’L L. 733, 756 (1995) (reviewing YVES BEIGBEDER, 
INTERNATIONAL MONITORING OF PLEBISCITES, REFERENDA AND NATIONAL 
ELECTIONS: SELF-DETERMINATION AND TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY (1994)) 
(discussing the organization that mechanisms of internal self-determination can 
provide a failed state with the help of the international community; through “a 
combination of peace among the warring factions, establishment of democratic 
processes, guarantees of non-interference, and economic aid[, a failed state] can 
ensure that they may begin to function in a meaningful way as autonomous political 
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giving them the power to separate when times get tough.164 
Moreover, the government of Somalia did not single out the 
people of Somaliland in order to deny them the right to self-
determination. Because of the lack of an effective government, 
no citizen of Somalia has had a particularly effective way to 
practice internal self-determination since the beginning of the 
civil war. The region of Puntland, located in northern Somalia 
on the tip of the Horn of Africa, also declared itself independent 
of the government of Somalia in 1998.165 If an entire country is 
denied the right to internal self-determination, can the entire 
country break away from itself? Though international law is 
largely silent on the issue of self-determination in the case of 
failed states, in light of the deference shown to territorial 
integrity in international law,166 it seems inconsistent to suggest 
a solution in which a country somehow separates from itself, or, 
the more likely result, fragments into several regions asserting 
a right to independence. 
C. SOMALILAND LACKS A LEGAL BASIS FOR SECESSION 
Finally, the people of Somaliland might choose to exercise 
their right to self-determination by opting to secede from 
Somalia. Perhaps Somaliland’s best legal argument for 
independence in the furtherance of self-determination arises 
under one of the three legal theories of secession—bilateral, 
unilateral (“remedial”), or de facto. However, under the current 
circumstances in Somalia, even the theories regarding secession 
provide an inadequate argument for Somaliland independence. 
1. Bilateral Secession 
Under the theory of bilateral secession, the primary aim is 
cooperation between the party seeking independence and the 
 
societies.”). 
 164. This is not to suggest that international law requires Somaliland to use 
internal self-determination to work for peace in the south; this would be impractical, 
and a heavy burden to place upon a region that struggles to maintain its own peace. 
 165. See Bay, supra note 1; see also Hassan Barise, Somali Warlords Battle for 
Puntland, BBC NEWS, May 7, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1972557.stm. 
Unfortunately, though Puntland operates somewhat autonomously of Mogadishu, it 
still suffers from near-anarchic conditions. Two problems contribute to this: 
Puntland’s border tensions with Somaliland and the prevalence of maritime piracy. 
See Bay, supra note 1. 
 166. See Borgen, supra note 25, at 8; Orakhelashvili, supra note 35, at 288.  
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parent state.167 Bilateral secession has two requirements. First, 
Somali domestic law would need to make some provision for 
secession—whether through adoption of legislation specifically 
allowing it or some other method. Second, Somaliland would 
need to engage in “principled negotiations” with the Somali 
government on the issue of secession.168 Theoretically, 
Somalilanders could negotiate with the Transitional 
Government and make a political push for legislation granting 
secession. Currently, however, there are two obvious, 
insurmountable barriers to any efforts at bilateral secession. 
First, the current state of lawlessness in the country precludes 
such political or legislative action; and second, even if that were 
not the case, the Somali government is not favorable to the idea 
of a breakup of the country.169 
2. Unilateral Secession 
The theory of unilateral secession requires three elements: 
that the Somalilanders are a “people,” that the Somali 
government subjected them to serious human rights violations, 
and that no other viable options exist.170 There is, however, little 
evidence to support such a claim. As to the requirement that the 
citizens of Somaliland be a common people, the population of 
Somaliland consists largely of members of the Isaaq clan.171 The 
Isaaq, however, are not an ethnic or cultural minority; rather, 
they are one of the larger clans in Somalia, along with the 
 
 167. Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 264–67 (Can.) 
(discussing the efforts that the secessionist movement in Quebec would need to take 
to successfully gain independence, including a national referendum, addressing the 
interests of the provinces and the federal government, and addressing the rights of 
minorities). 
 168. See id. at 273 (discussing the issue of secession in light of Quebec, stating 
that it cannot be accomplished without principled negotiations with other 
participants in the Confederation within the existing constitutional framework). 
 169. See Del, supra note 138, at A16 (“It should be noted that Somaliland was 
never intended to be ‘independent’ from Somalia.”).  
 170. See Borgen, supra note 25, at 8. 
 171. United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, Somalia: 
Somali Government Policy Towards the Isaaq Clan, Somalia, Jan. 9, 1998, available 
at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3df0bbc14.html (stating that the Isaaq clan 
“make up 80 percent of the former British Somaliland.”); see also Samatar, supra 
note 92, at 50 (“The Isaaq as a clan-family occupy the northern portion of the 
country [Somaliland]. Three major cities are predominantly, if not exclusively, 
Isaaq: Hargeysa, the second largest city in Somalia . . . Burao in the interior . . . and 
the port of Berbera.”). 
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Hawiye, Darod, Dir, and Rahanweyn.172 
In nearly all cases of successful secession (and even in many 
recent unsuccessful ones) the party who argued for 
independence was an ethnic minority.173 The most prominent 
recent case is that of Kosovo, which has arguably been a 
successful secession thus far.174 In that case, the people seceding 
were ethnic Albanians, a minority in Serbia.175 Another example 
is South Ossetia’s recent attempts to gain independence from 
Georgia. The people of South Ossetia claim that: “South 
Ossetians are ethnically distinct from Georgians and have 
comprised a semi-autonomous community within Georgia for 
seven hundred years.”176 In these and other cases, those seeking 
independence are a distinct minority.177 This is not the case in 
Somaliland. The Isaaq clan, which makes up a large portion of 
the population in Somaliland, is not a significant minority 
within Somalia as a whole, nor are they sufficiently distinct—
ethnically, culturally, or religiously—from the rest of the Somali 
population to constitute a “people.”178 
 
 172. Draper, supra note 1, at 78. 
 173. Kosovo is the most prominent example of successful secession—ethnic 
Albanians within a country of Serbs. Borgen, supra note 25, at 3. South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia are both ethnic minorities within Georgia, and both wish to secede. Id. at 
4–5. Cf. Special Comm., supra note 45, at 389 (discussing the Transnistrian 
secessionists, who are ethnically Ukrainian, as is a significant portion of the rest of 
Moldova). 
 174. The success of Kosovo’s secession is arguably dependent on a case on the 
issue currently before the International Court of Justice, brought by Serbia, who 
contests the secession. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of 
Kosovo (Req. for Advisory Op.) (Order of Oct. 10, 2008), available at  
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=4&k=21&case=141&code=kos&p3=0 
(last visited Feb. 22, 2010); see also Bing Bing Jia, The Independence of Kosovo: A 
Unique Case of Secession?, 8 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 27, 42 (2009). This case poses a 
problem for the countries who have already announced their position in the Kosovo 
matter—recognition or non-recognition—because by taking a side while “the issue 
was a pending matter before the ICJ . . . could be seen by many as flouting the 
prerogatives” of the ICJ. Borgen, supra note 25, at 16. 
 175. Borgen, supra note 25, at 3 (describing the ethnic Albanian population as 
the majority in Kosovo, but a minority within Serbia). 
 176. Id. at 4.  
 177. In the case of Abkhazia, as in the case of South Ossetia, the citizens are 
mostly ethnic Russians, within a country that has an ethnically Georgian majority. 
Borgen, supra note 25, at 20. “South Ossetia and Abkhazia are breakaway provinces 
within the former Soviet republic of Georgia. These two provinces have functioned as 
de facto states in recent years.” Sterio, supra note 55, at 167–68. See also Reference 
re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 261–63 (Can.) (discussing the protection 
of minorities). 
 178. Draper, supra note 1, at 78 (“According to the great Somali ethnographer, 
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Second, we look to the issue of human rights. Under the 
oppressive reign of Siad Barre, the Isaaq were certainly victims 
of atrocity at the hands of the Somali government.179 During the 
1980s, when the abuses of the Siad Barre regime were at their 
peak, the government destroyed the Isaaq’s land and cities, and 
committed widespread murder and rape.180 The Isaaq, however, 
were not the only clan subjected to the cruelty of the Somali 
government. The situation was nearly identical for the members 
of the Majeerteen181 and the Hawiye182 clans. The common 
thread running through the persecution of each of the clans was 
their opposition, often violent, of the Siad Barre regime.183 
Despite the severity of the human rights abuses perpetrated 
against the Isaaq, it is unclear whether they are sufficiently 
significant to support an argument in favor of justified 
unilateral secession. For example, in the case of Kosovo, the 
Serbian abuses gave rise to the term “ethnic cleansing,”184 and 
on that basis is distinguishable from the case of Somaliland.185 
Other examples of alleged human rights violations committed 
against secessionist groups provide little guidance in 
determining a workable test for justification of unilateral 
secession.186 Historically, as in the case of Kosovo, the human 
 
I.M. Lewis, Somalia’s occupants ‘form one of the largest single ethnic blocks in 
Africa.’”). 
 179. See Samatar, supra note 92, at 51. 
 180. See id. (“An estimated 5,000 Isaaq were killed between May 27 and the end 
of December 1988. About 4,000 died in the fighting, but 1,000, including women and 
children, were alleged to have been bayoneted to death.”). 
 181. Id. at 50. The Majeerteen are a sub-clan of the Darod clan. WORLD BANK, 
CONFLICT IN SOMALIA: DRIVERS AND DYNAMICS (2005), fig. A–1, at 55. 
 182. Samatar, supra note 92, at 51. 
 183. See id. at 49–50 (detailing the efforts of these three clans against the 
government, including an attempted coup d’état by the Majeerteen and the military 
campaigns of the Isaaq-led Somali National Movement). 
 184. Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Sec’y of State, Statement Recognizing Kosovo as 
Independent State (Feb. 18, 2008), available at http://www.america.gov/st/ 
texttrans-english/2008/February/20080218150254bpuh5.512637e-02.html (citing 
“the history of ethnic cleansing and crimes against civilians in Kosovo” as support 
for U.S. recognition of Kosovo as an independent state). For a discussion of the 
meaning of “ethnic cleansing,” see Alberto Costi, The 60th Anniversary of the 
Genocide Convention, 39 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 831, 838 (2009) (“[Ethnic 
cleansing] involves forcefully removing groups of people from an area, to create an 
ethnically homogenous zone. This can involve considerable force and terror tactics 
that, prima facie, could provide a basis for a finding of genocide.”). 
 185. See Rice, supra note 184 (“The unusual combination of factors found in the 
Kosovo situation . . . are not found elsewhere and therefore make Kosovo a special 
case. Kosovo cannot be seen as a precedent for any situation in the world today.”). 
 186. In Moldova, for example, the as-yet unsuccessful separatist Transnistrians 
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rights violations perpetrated against a people must be more 
severe than those faced by the Isaaq in order to justify 
unilateral secession.187 
Finally, if any other remedies exist, Somaliland must resort 
to such remedies before seceding.188 It may be difficult to 
envision paths that Somaliland might take to hasten peace in 
the south, especially given its own tenuous grip on stability. The 
region might push for independence through a national 
referendum similar to the one of 1960, or suggest a form of 
federalism and decentralization to gain at least an element of 
autonomy from the Transitional Government in Mogadishu. 
Nevertheless, even if other options open to Somaliland are 
infeasible, it does not meet the other elements of the test. To 
meet the test, Somaliland must fulfill all the requirements. It 
fails the first two requirements, and, arguably, it also fails the 
third. They are not a “people” according to the accepted 
definition: an ethnic or cultural minority.189 They have arguably 
not faced the types of human rights violations that can justify 
secession.190 They may have other possible remedies, short of 
secession.191 
 
cite “a lack of due process, persecution of religious minorities, and retaliation 
against political dissenters,” and the 1000 deaths in the 1992 war as a basis for their 
claims of secession. See Special Committee, supra note 45, at 384 (arguing that “the 
events of the 1992 War in and of themselves do not make a persuasive claim of 
secession as a legal right. If they did, the world would be rife with secessionist 
conflicts”). On the other hand, in the case of South Ossetia, whose independence only 
Russia and Nicaragua recognize, it is unclear whether the Georgians or the South 
Ossetians were the first to use force during the secession efforts. See Borgen, supra 
note 25, at 5–6. 
 187. The common understanding of human rights violations encompasses more 
than just infringement of physical security. Equally important are political, social, 
and economic rights. See Kenneth A. Bollen, Political Rights and Political Liberties 
in Nations: An Evaluation of Human Rights Measures, 1950 to 1984, 8 HUM. RTS. Q. 
567, 567 (1986). The only clear case of what constitutes sufficiently severe human 
rights violations, however, is the case of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. See Borgen, 
supra note 25, at 11. 
 188. See Special Comm., supra note 45, at 384. 
 189. See Borgen, supra note 25, at 7–8. 
 190. See, e.g., id. at 11. 
 191. Some argue that federalism is an antidote to secession and other forms of 
dissolution. See MALCOM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL 
IDENTITY AND TRAGIC COMPROMISE 51 (2008) (arguing that a federal system allows 
decentralization of decision-making power, which may give secessionists sufficient 
autonomy and allow the country to avoid dissolution). Nevertheless, it seems 
impractical to suggest that a failed state like Somalia has the capacity to implement 
such a structural change. For a discussion of other issues arising out of the question 
of federalism and secession, see WAYNE J. NORMAN, NEGOTIATION NATIONALISM: 
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3. De Facto Secession 
On one hand one might argue that, since 1991, Somaliland 
has already gained independence through de facto secession. De 
facto secession on its own, however, is legally insufficient.192 
Somaliland may have a better argument for legal de facto 
secession if foreign nations recognized their independence, but 
no state has done so.193 What if other nations did recognize 
Somaliland? Some have held that de facto secession becomes 
acceptable if enough nations recognize the seceding state.194 If 
this view were the legal standard guiding secession, however, it 
would harm both the separatists and the states from which they 
secede.195 
At the most basic level, the argument for the legality of 
secession emphasizes the right of self-determination; it 
emphasizes the autonomy of individuals and communities. But 
if secession efforts depend upon recognition by foreign powers, 
the focus shifts away from the interests of the people seeking to 
exercise self-determination and onto the interests of the nations 
who may or may not opt to recognize them.196 Foreign 
governments will—quite understandably—look to their own 
interests first when considering whether to extend recognition, 
rather than examining the legal sufficiency of the secession 
claim.197 Recognition, therefore, would depend on what the 
recognizing state might get out of the deal, rather than what is 
most beneficial to the people seeking recognition.198 Moreover, it 
 
NATION-BUILDING, FEDERALISM, AND SECESSION IN THE MULTINATIONAL STATE 178–
79 (2006). 
 192. See Reference Re Secession of Quebec, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 217, 296 (Can.) 
(stating that recognition is not a “retroactive justification” for secession). 
 193. See Draper, supra note 1, at 86. 
 194. See id. at 296 (“The ultimate success of such a [de facto] secession would be 
dependent on recognition by the international community, which is likely to consider 
the legality and legitimacy of secession having regard to, amongst other facts, the 
conduct of Quebec and Canada, in determining whether to grant or withhold 
recognition.”). 
 195. See Worster, supra note 19, at 150–51 (“One problem that unlimited 
discretion may pose is that it can be manipulated for political ends and may provide 
a vehicle for more dominant states to control less powerful ones through the 
overarching goal of promoting security.”). 
 196. For more discussion of this issue, see Poore, supra note 15, at 136 and 
Worster, supra note 19, at 149–51. 
 197. Worster, supra note 19, at 120–21 (“Larger, more powerful states that are 
secure in their recognition may use recognition as a tool for their continued 
domination of other states.”). 
 198. See id. The most overt recent display of self-interested recognition was by 
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is unlikely that de facto secession through recognition could 
even lead to a meaningful legal standard. Because of their 
competing self-interests, if recognizing nations differ over 
whether to extend recognition, it would likely be unclear 
whether the number of recognizing states was sufficient to 
justify secession.199 Furthermore, because recognition does not 
depend on the merits of the secessionists’ claim to independence, 
but on the recognizing state, the rationale may appear arbitrary 
and provide no guidance for future cases.200 
Such a legal standard also implicates the rights of the 
parent state. International law gives great deference to state 
sovereignty.201 If other nations, through the act of recognition, 
hold the power to give or to withhold the right to secession, the 
parent state’s right to sovereignty becomes subject to the caprice 
of recognizing nations.202 A parent state has the right to declare 
secession illegal under domestic law—but other states would 
render that law worthless by recognizing a seceding region. 
Such a standard might imply that international law takes 
precedence over a sovereign state’s domestic law—when, in 
reality, the opposite is true, especially as the law relates to the 
issue of secession.203 States also have a right to preservation of 
their existing borders.204 Both the rights to territorial integrity 
 
Nauru. This economically depressed island country in the Pacific Ocean received $50 
million from Russia in return for recognizing Abkhazia as independent of Georgia. 
See Ellen Barry, A Tiny New Partner for Abkhazia, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 16, 
2009, at 3. 
 199. This is one of the reasons why Kosovo’s case is in front of the ICJ. In that 
case, recognition has proved to be an obscure standard. See generally Borgen, supra 
note 25, at 15–16. 
 200. Cf. Sterio, supra note 55, at 171–73 (discussing the “Great Powers’” 
decisions to support or oppose secessionist movements). 
 201. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (enjoining member states to “refrain 
. . . from the threat or use of force against the . . . political independence of any 
state”). 
 202. Dr. Raju G.C. Thomas, Nationalism, Secession, and Conflict: Legacies from 
the Former Yugoslavia, Paper presented at the 1st Annual Association for Study of 
Nationalities Convention (April 26–28, 1996), available at  
http://www.srpska-mreza.com/MAPS/Ethnic-groups/Self-Determination.html 
(“[N]ew state recognition policy proved to be an inventive method of destroying long-
standing sovereign independent states. When several rich and powerful states 
decide to take a sovereign independent state apart through the policy of recognition, 
how is this state supposed to defend itself?”). 
 203. See Borgen, supra note 25, at 8; see also Special Comm., supra note 45, at 
383 (“[G]rants of ‘autonomy’ are largely issues of domestic law.”). 
 204. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity 
or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
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and state sovereignty suffer if recognition is an adequate 
remedy to illegal secession. 
The future of Somaliland’s attempts to secede from Somalia, 
therefore, seems bleak. Though it is relatively stable, no country 
recognizes it as independent of Somalia.205 Nor is it of any help 
that the current principles of international law that speak to 
Somaliland’s situation—the legal basis for statehood, the right 
to self-determination, justifications for secession, the strong 
respect for the integrity of national borders—establish a high 
threshold for secession. Under international law, Somaliland 
likely lacks justification to secede. This attests to a need for an 
expansion of the law of secession, to accommodate regions like 
Somaliland, who may not secede from Somalia, but who are also 
denied self-determination because of the failure of the Somali 
government. 
III. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW RELATED TO SECESSION 
SHOULD BE BROADENED TO ENCOMPASS 
SECESSIONIST EFFORTS WITHIN FAILED STATES 
Under current international law, aspiring secessionists 
must overcome a high threshold to justify their actions. There 
are several reasons for such a high bar. First, if the standards 
were looser and justification for secession easier to attain, state 
sovereignty would suffer.206 Because the legality of secession is 
primarily an issue of domestic law,207 it would frustrate Somali 
law to allow Somaliland to secede absent any recognized 
compelling justification to do so. In the case of Somaliland, no 
such justification exists. In the prototypical case of international 
law circumventing domestic law as it pertains to secession, the 
inhabitants of Kosovo were both an ethnic minority within 
Serbia and were subject to ethnic cleansing by the Serb 
government.208 The Somalilanders can claim neither.209 Finally, 
 
Purposes of the United Nations.”). 
 205. See Draper, supra note 1, at 86. 
 206. See Brock Lyle, Note, Blood for Oil: Secession, Self-Determination, and 
Superpower Silence in Cabinda, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 701, 707 (2005) 
(“[T]oo broad a definition of self-determination makes it impossible to keep countries 
together. Therefore, the threshold for secession based on self-determination should 
be very high to avoid fractionalization based on minor divergences of interest.”). 
 207. See Borgen, supra note 25, at 8. 
 208. See id. at 3–4. 
 209. Though the clans of Somaliland were subjected to violence under the Barre 
regime, the clans in southern Somalia faced similar abuses that, in some cases, were 
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some argue that other nations might justify Somaliland’s 
secession by recognizing its statehood.210 The principle of 
justified secession through recognition does not help 
Somaliland. No nation has formally recognized Somaliland,211 
nor would recognition make for a reliable legal standard.212 Self-
interest would motivate the recognizing nations, creating a 
situation in which competing incentives define the legal 
standard.213 Such a standard lacks consistency and would be 
difficult to apply coherently. Under current legal standards, 
Somaliland cannot justifiably become an independent state. 
This has dubious implications for the future of Somaliland. 
It is, effectively, in political limbo. No outside government will 
interact with it on a formal level.214 Practically, Somalilanders 
cannot even appeal to their own government.215 Because they 
have no practical legal recourse, the people of Somaliland are 
bound to the anarchy of Somalia. An entire generation of 
Somalilanders does not know life apart from civil war.216 Most 
importantly, the people of Somaliland are not responsible for the 
current state of the country. The clans of Somaliland settled 
their grievances in the mid-1990s.217 The current violence stems 
directly from the absence of an effective government in 
Mogadishu in the south.218 Somaliland, and more broadly, any 
stable region within a failed state, is condemned to the 
 
even worse. See Samatar, supra note 92, at 48–52 (describing Barre’s “repressive 
measures” against various clans including his command that the Red Berets 
massacre civilians in the Hawiye region which is located in the south central portion 
of Somalia). 
 210. See generally Vidmar, supra note 32, at 827–28. 
 211. See Draper, supra note 1, at 86. 
 212. See Vidmar, supra note 32, at 827–28 (“[T]he situation in which one state 
may be recognized by some states, but not by others, is an evident problem and thus 
a great deficiency of the constitutive theory.”). 
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uncertainty and lawlessness stemming from a toothless 
government, which confines and limits its blameless 
inhabitants.219 
For this reason, the international law of statehood and 
secession should be broadened to fill the analytical void 
pertaining to secession in the case of a failed state. Two issues 
are important: the interests of states in preserving state 
sovereignty and the right of people to exercise self-
determination. Currently, the people in a failed state have no 
hope of exercising their right to self-determination and are 
condemned to failure if the state lacks the stabilizing hand of an 
effective government or if other justifications for self-
determination or secession do not apply. The law must provide a 
correction for this error. It would be equally dangerous, 
however, to shift the balance too far in the opposite direction. If 
the law legitimizes the right to self-determination to the 
detriment of state sovereignty, it renders impotent the domestic 
laws and the traditional rights of states.220 The state again 
becomes burdened by an effectually powerless government, just 
as it is in the opposite extreme. Any broadening of the law to 
accommodate secessionist efforts within a failed state requires 
narrow tailoring to bring these interests into equipoise. 
To create this balance, a reformed test must include two 
general requirements. The parent state must have failed, 
according to an objective standard for failure. Likewise, the 
secessionist region within the country must exhibit the opposite 
attributes—demonstrating that it can govern itself where the 
parent state has failed. In light of the need to balance the 
interests of people with those of states, and in the spirit of the 
methodologies of various organizations that evaluate the failure 
of states,221 the test must make a fact-specific analysis of the 
essential factors defining failed states. 
Most failed-state metrics emphasize the importance of three 
elements in determining the strength of a state: security, 
 
 219. The plight of the Somalilanders recalls Thomas Hobbes’ classical 
description of life without the order provided by a functioning government: Citizens 
live in “continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, 
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political participation, and basic civil services.222 These 
represent the basic functions of a state. Without these features, 
a nation would lack the ability to maintain the order necessary 
for a stable society. Without security, there is no check on 
violence or crime, hampering both the health and economic 
development of the state’s citizens.223 Without the ability to 
participate in the political process, people lose the right to self-
determination, calling the legitimacy of the government into 
question.224 Without civil services, the state loses the 
“institutions to regulate and adjudicate conflicts; [the] rule of 
law, secure property rights, [and] contract enforcement.”225 
In light of the presumption of deference to state 
sovereignty, however, the legal test for justifiable secession from 
a failed state should be narrow. The parent state should be 
given every opportunity to correct its course before secessionists 
are allowed to justifiably declare independence. To mitigate this 
danger, the test should include a time element, as some analysts 
have suggested.226 A state must be failing for a reasonable 
amount of time before the secession can be justified. In addition, 
the secessionists must overcome a threshold test. As a potential 
state, it must be capable of the things that the failed state is 
not. It must be able to provide security to its people.227 Some 
mechanism of political participation must exist.228 The 
secessionists must have the means to provide civil services.229 
Most importantly, they must be able to operate a stable state for 
 
 222. See, e.g., id. at 4–5; Fund for Peace, supra note 82 (listing “Progressive 
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 223. See Di John, supra note 78, at 4–6. 
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 226. See id. at 9. 
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a reasonable amount of time. This test provides citizens of a 
truly failed state the power to improve their condition and 
exercise the right to self-determination, but not at the expense 
of the sovereignty of the parent state, except, perhaps, in the 
extreme cases when a state cannot even function as such. 
One inquiry remains—to apply this test to Somaliland 
within Somalia. Somalia is a failed state by any objective 
measure. Some analyses place Somalia at the top of the list of 
the world’s worst failures.230 Because of the violence of the civil 
war, the government cannot even provide the most basic 
functions of a state.231 Furthermore, because the civil war in the 
south has been raging since 1991 with no signs of slowing,232 
and there are few signs of improvement from the government,233 
there is a strong argument that a reasonable amount of time 
has passed since the country had a functioning government. 
Conversely, during the same time period, Somaliland has shown 
progression. After peace “broke out” in the region in the mid-
1990s, Somaliland has had a vibrant political culture, a form of 
representative government, and enough security and stability to 
experience a modicum of economic development.234 Somaliland’s 
largest city, Hargeysa, even had its first traffic light installed 
recently.235 Somaliland has demonstrated the ability to govern 
itself while Somalia has not. Under the proposed test, 
Somaliland can justifiably secede from Somalia, because it can 
provide the basic functions of a government that Somalia 
cannot, and Somalia has failed long enough to create a power 
vacuum. Therefore an independent state of Somaliland would 
not impinge upon Somali sovereignty. 
CONCLUSION 
Under the current international legal standards, 
Somaliland cannot escape the volatility and anarchy of southern 
Somalia. Internal self-determination is not possible because the 
Somali state has failed and Somalilanders are unable to exercise 
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their political rights. In addition, international law currently 
reserves secession for particular circumstances not applicable to 
Somaliland. Secession is attainable under domestic law through 
cooperation with the parent state,236 unilaterally in response to 
human rights violations,237 or, arguably, through recognition by 
other nations.238 There is a gap in the law of secession, however, 
as it applies to failed states, such as Somalia. In recognition of 
the devastating effects that a failed state has on its inhabitants, 
the law of secession should allow secession when the parent 
state has been unable to provide security, a functioning political 
system, and civil services for a reasonable amount of time, and 
when the secessionists have been able to provide each of these 
state functions. Such a test improves upon the current laws of 
secession by permitting those living within a failed state like 
Somalia to escape the binds caused by the absence of 
government while preserving state sovereignty by allowing 
secession in only the most extreme situations. 
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